Editors’ Introduction: 
Policing the Protest Cycle of the 2010s

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By the time this special issue is released, it will have been over 10 years since the collapse of Lehman Brothers and the beginning of the Great Recession: one of the most decisive periods for global economic transformation in recent decades. However, it is 2011, rather than 2008, that is associated with the moment of political transformation: it was then that a sort of protective countermovement reappeared on the global stage, a diffuse community of workers and collectives affected by capitalism, to which Polanyi (1944/2001) attributes the historic function of protecting society from the worst effects of the free market. Contentious politics were put off for three years while the actors involved in austerity politics began implementing a project to take neoliberal discourses and practices to unprecedented levels (Dardot & Laval 2009/2013). In most cases, the hopes for change and resistance generated by these protests remain far off and unsatisfied as of today.

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The Global Protest Cycle and Its Waves: Globalization’s Winners and Losers

The rise of protest movements in the last decade has generated a renewed interest in the long-range historical analysis of the role of riots and other forms of resistance in the context of capitalist development (see Clement 2016). Some of these recent contributions have emphasized the centrality of the relation between riots and crisis, highlighting the changing importance of riots and strikes from a broad historical materialist perspective (Clover 2016). In this issue and introduction, however, we are going to focus on some of the political characteristics and consequences of protest and its policing in the recent past. In particular, the protest cycle (Tarrow 1983) to be analyzed in this issue starts to take shape in 2008 and to flare up in 2011. In 2013, it surges forth in a second wave before beginning to dwindle over the following three years, but not without a few eruptions of lesser significance such as Nuit debout in France in 2016. The antiglobalization movement can be seen to be this cycle’s immediate predecessor; however, the cycle under question is distinguished by more diverse social bases and a more diffuse political identity, which places it halfway between movements of affluence and movements of crisis. It is difficult, in this sense, to speak of a homogeneous movement: the cycle incorporates geographically and politically diverse contexts. However, continuities and shared elements can also be found: frames and repertoires of action extend across diverse areas adapting to different situations with different degrees of mobilization capacity (della Porta 2017, 14).

Indeed, it is important to distinguish between the different waves within the cycle itself. 2011 could be classified as a year of global contention, comparable, for example, to 1848 and 1968. The wave of protests of 2011 begins with the Arab Spring before spreading to Southern Europe, particularly to Greece and Spain, some of the countries most affected by the financial crisis. From there the contagion spreads to the United States, with Occupy Wall Street inspired by the protests of Southern Europe, which, in turn, had been inspired by protests in Tunisia and Egypt. In 2013, there was a second wave of mobilization, which extended to countries such as Brazil, Turkey, Ukraine, Venezuela, South Africa, Bosnia, and Bulgaria. The protests of the 2011 wave can easily be shown to share a common denominator: they involved opposition to austerity policies in semiperipheral countries with highly contentious environments where the effects of the last financial crisis were acutely suffered. However, some of the 2013–2014 protests emerged in
countries that are often considered the winners of globalization in economic terms (Brazil, Venezuela, Turkey, South Africa, and Hong Kong), and others in countries without particularly contentious environments (Ukraine, Bulgaria, and Bosnia).

Despite these differences (and others), however, participants in both protests and academic analyses have coincided in identifying the existence of continuities and common features, to which we now turn our attention.

**Common Features of the Protest Cycle**

First among these common characteristics is the centrality of democracy in the practices and claims channeled through protests. In authoritarian political contexts, as well as in liberal democracies, speaking out against the corruption of the elites in government was a common denominator, but there was more to it than making objections against the established order. One of the great novelties of the protest cycle was its ability to produce a political culture that was *lived* as radically new, a culture that had been considered impossible prior to the cycle by many protest participants. In the occupied squares and at demonstrations, a decidedly egalitarian conception of democracy was championed and embodied, and this conception was made manifest, not just in juxtaposition to the increasingly weak electoral mechanisms of legitimation promoted by neoliberalism. This conception of democracy was also strongly linked to defending urban commons (Dardot & Laval 2014, Hardt & Negri 2009) and public spaces and services—a defense which was carried out not solely through occupations and encampments, tactics that were previously associated (for the most part) with Western anarchist circles, but also through making claims to and a practice out of public space, which was understood as collective life experience in the face of the impoverishment of forms of sociability and coexistence (akin to a phenomenon referred to as “spatial citizenship,” see Sbicca & Perdue 2014, Sorando Ortín & González-Sánchez 2013). The novelty, according to scholars like Tuğal (2013, 152), was not the political efficacy of this type of action, so much as the experience of a life in common in a liberated square in the city, albeit temporary and limited.

The second common feature is directly linked to the first: the radical equality put into practice in the squares was not formalized in demands relating to electoral programs—at least not to the same extent as it emerged in the form of prefigurative politics. The “collective thereness” (Butler 2014) of bodies refusing to be expelled from the streets and occupied spaces was a
practice of resistance and challenge, but also a manifestation of the will to exist as part of a larger whole, the prefiguration of a new collective identity lived, intensely, in the present (Butler 2014; della Porta 2017, 228). Politically, this approach resulted in a clear distancing from the electoral political system: square occupiers in Greece, Spain, and Turkey showed their open disinterest in the potential electoral transfer of their actions. This abstentionism became particularly rigid in some cases, including in the United States. Occupy Wall Street participants refused to formulate articulated demands, as directing demands to the political establishment would be a way of recognizing its legitimacy (Jacobs 2011; Tuğal 2013, 161). This distancing from representative politics is what led authors such as Harcourt (2012) to point out that the traditional concept of “civil disobedience” is obsolete when it comes to designating the political intervention type of movements like Occupy; to fill the breach, this U.S. political scientist coined the notion of “political disobedience.” In other countries, as was the case of the Indignados movement in Spain, proposals were made in different areas including the labor market, the right to housing, and the regulation of the banking system. In any case, experimentation with forms of direct democracy and modes of organization in which formal leadership was avoided clearly prevailed over any potential strategy to create new political parties or promote reforms to the existing system of representative democracy. It must be said, though, that the end of the cycle of mobilization in countries like Spain and Greece did coincide with a renewed interest in electoral politics and with the emergence of new parties such as Syriza and Podemos; however, the relationship between these parties and protest movements was never particularly natural. In fact, their electoral surge seemed to mark the beginning of the demobilization phase in the streets. The link between movements such as UK Uncut or Occupy Wall Street with the renewing candidacies of Corbyn in the United Kingdom and of Sanders in the United States within traditional parties appears to have been equally complex, although perhaps less tortuous. The subsequent evolution in the electoral plane—with Syriza’s inability to resist European impositions in Greece; the failure of Podemos in Spain (beyond specific local experiences) to take power in a progressive sense; or the arrival of Donald Trump to the presidency of the United States—does not shed an encouraging light on the political impact of protests in these countries. Nevertheless, the legacy of the 2011 cycle persists in a different way in the field of political culture (Tuğal 2013, 152).
A third shared element intersects the two previously discussed factors: the Great Recession as a common political and economic context. Although it is not appropriate to describe all the mobilizations involved as forms of protest against austerity policies, their analysis, as della Porta (2015) has emphasized, must not be limited to examining their social composition or their forms of communication and organization. It must be framed from a perspective that incorporates political economy and the evolution of neoliberal capitalism in recent decades (bringing capitalism back in). Thus, the search for continuities must take us beyond the 2008 crisis: protests against the advance of neoliberalism (ibid., 66) could have spread from the periphery (the struggle in Latin America against reforms imposed by international financial institutions in the 1980s and 1990s) to the semiperiphery (Southern Europe, the Middle East), to finally reach capitalism’s centers (the United States, the United Kingdom). With all their particularities, in both the Global South and the Global North the twofold manifestation of the Great Recession context appears ever present: the proletarization of the middle class and the pauperization of the working class, as well as the resurgence of the authoritarian and illiberal tendencies of the neoliberal project, which call into question, once again, the myth that political liberalism is linked to capitalism.

The Importance of Analyzing the Repression of This Protest Cycle

Here it becomes particularly important to analyze one of the key aspects of the mobilization cycle: the different ways in which it was repressed, considering specific contexts and current repercussions. As Tuğal (2013, 148–49) points out, the development and implementation of new forms of police control intensified as turbulence continued, underlining the authoritarian tendencies of liberal political systems (for more detail on this, see Butler 2004, Dean 2007): “Just as in the Paris Commune of 1871, issues of capitalism and police control became intrinsically linked.”

Historical analysis certainly confirms that the need to repress political protest is significant in itself: it can be seen as a trigger for the formation and consolidation of new forms of state configuration. The study of the evolution of police organization serves as a good indicator of state transformations and the evolution of the types of violence that are considered legitimate at each moment, as well as the relationship between them. For example, the emergence of modern police forces, like London’s, was closely
linked to armies’ failures to control the disorder of riots and disturbances in nineteenth-century urban and bourgeois contexts (Neocleous 2000, 78; Reiner 2010, 48). In contrast to more generalized interpretations, according to which the purpose of the police is to manage the emergent mercantile and proprietary order (Harcourt 2012), some recent analyses (Roberts 2016, Vitale 2017) make a clearer distinction between the repression of political dissidence function and the crime control function and locate the origin of the institution of the police as fundamentally linked to the former. “The principal object of the police should be to repress disorder, the next, to detect crime,” a progressive English legislator affirmed in 1823 (see Roberts 2016, 19). Selective police charges against demonstrators, and the overwhelming demonstrations of force that were so iconic to the cycle analyzed (and to previous cycles) were among the first innovations of the London Metropolitan Police in 1830, a novelty that allowed them to dissolve and even prevent riots without the usual cost in deaths and damages that military charges had incurred, though serious injuries were still inflicted (ibid.).

In the United States and the United Kingdom, in step with the dismantling of the workers’ movement and the imposition of technocratic emergency political powers, the pacification of the protective countermovement must have taken place because of innovations to police repression styles (ibid., 3). At this time of austerity, one branch of the government apparatus, the police, gets its moment of big government. The exportation of this model of protest control to countries with different cultural contexts, political histories, and class relations may explain the greater virulence of protest movements in the semiperiphery and the periphery. In any event, we appear to be facing a period of intense intolerance toward economic and social disruption. If we consider this alongside the unprecedented technical capacity to, for instance, monitor whole sectors of the population thanks to the mass use of the internet (Maroto Calatayud & Segura Vázquez 2018), it becomes clear that the future of crowd politics is uncertain.

Despite the fact that much academic attention has been given to social movements during this cycle of protests, not nearly as much attention, or at least as much systematic attention, has been paid to the control and repression of this cycle. We consider repression to be key to understanding the present and future of the punitive system in current political models—so too are its reciprocal performative effects, as the punitive system and current political models are often exercised and justified by each other—and we intend to address this topic throughout this issue.
Institutional Violence against Protests: Changing Limits

The global protest cycle emerging in 2011 involved a broad repertoire of political action with different variations in different countries. At the same time, the variety of ways in which these mobilizations have been handled by the police is also striking. Above and beyond these different policing methods, common ground is to be found regarding the limits on the use of institutional violence (Marx 1998, 255). Put simply, despite the intensity and scale of protest actions, the death toll in countries of the Global North for this mobilization cycle is zero.

From Heavy-Handed Policing to Soft Policing

This is one difference between current and previous mobilization cycles. For protests of the late 1960s and early 1970s in European countries such as France and Germany, the use of lethal state violence was already rare. However, clashes with security forces on the streets led to some deaths, such as Benno Ohnesorg in West Berlin, Germany, in June 1967 (Rethmann 2006, Soukup 2017) and Pierre Overney in Billancourt, France, in February 1972 (Puech 2012). In contrast, the use of lethal violence by police forces was more frequent in other countries, like the United States and Italy, at this stage. In the case of the United States, the deaths of four students (Allison Krause, Jeffrey Miller, Sandra Scheuer, and William Schroeder) at the hands of the Ohio National Guard on the Kent State campus in May 1970 is still remembered today as the Kent State massacre (Bills 1988, Gordon 1990). In Italy, the mobilization cycle that started around 1968 was certainly more intense and, of course, more extensive than in other European countries (Balestrini & Moroni 2003). In fact, it peaked in 1977, with the so-called Movement of 1977 (Bascetta et al. 1997, Bianchi & Caminiti 2004). That year (particularly the spring) was extremely violent and two activists died, one in Bologna (Francesco Lorusso in March) and one in Rome (Giorgiana Masi in May, Balestrini & Moroni 2003).

In the mobilization cycle at the turn of the century, a cycle generally described as the antiglobalization movement, the level of lethal violence was much lower. However, in July 2001, a demonstrator named Carlo Giuliani was killed by a carabiniere in Genoa, Italy (Chiesa 2001), and the police used firearms, without fatalities, in Gothenburg, Sweden, in June 2001.

This restraint in the use of lethal violence in protest management in countries of the Global North became progressively more prominent throughout the twentieth century (Palacios Cerezales 2011). Meeting politi-
cal and social protests with widespread use of firearms was characteristic of the second half of the nineteenth century—take the Haymarket massacre, which caused an unknown number of casualties in a demonstration held in Haymarket Square, Chicago, in May 1886 (Nelson 1988)—but this became less and less common in countries of the Global North over the next century. In fact, at least in Western Europe and the United States, it was a very uncommon phenomenon after the Second World War. It was only in a few countries, in which democratization arrived later, that demonstrations continued to routinely involve deaths into the second half of the twentieth century. In Italy, around 150 people died in demonstrations from 1947–1954 (Viola 2001). Similarly, in Spain, no less than 250 leftist activists and prodemocratic protesters died from 1976–1982 at the hands of the police (Sánchez Soler 2010, Wilhelmi 2016). The latter case brings to light a phenomenon that disappeared only a few decades ago, namely, the use of lethal violence against activists and demonstrators by means of illegal structures and right-wing organizations, often in collusion with state bodies. Undoubtedly, one of the best-known expressions of this were the so-called Anni di piombo (Years of Lead), from the late 1960s to the early 1980s, a period in Italian political history characterized by the widespread use of political violence (Galli 1986).

In short, protest management in the latest cycle has been characterized by the absence of lethal state violence. However, this absence has only been appreciable in countries of the Global North; thinking about police protest management there means forgetting what happened in other territories, particularly in countries where tens of thousands of demonstrators staged the Arab Spring in 2011–2012 (Brownlee et al. 2015, Haddad et al. 2012, Žižek 2012). Above and beyond the cases in which democratic protests led to civil wars (Syria, Yemen, and Libya), police management of protests produced high death tolls across the board. Around 850 people died during the Egyptian Revolution of 2011.1 The Tunisian Revolution of December 2010–January 2011 left more than 300 dead.2 In Bahrain, around 100 activists died during the 2011–2012 protests (Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry 2011).

To sum up, for the last global mobilization cycle, the use of lethal state violence is a factor that differentiates the management of the protest in European countries and the United States and the states of the Arab Spring; in the states of the Arab Spring, heavy-handed policing was one of the forms of protest management. This policing style does not seem to have been prevalent outside the countries of the Maghreb and the Middle East,
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and yet it was used elsewhere, most strikingly, perhaps, at the Euromaidan protests in Ukraine (November 2013–February 2014), where it led to an unknown number of deaths, which some sources estimate at almost 800 (Interfax-Ukraine 2014). In the Gezi Park protests in Turkey (May–July 2013), the use of police force caused no fewer than 10 deaths (David & Toktamis 2015, Gürcan & Peker 2015). Similarly, in the April–July 2013 protests in Brazil (Harvey et al. 2013, Judensnaider et al. 2013), police repression left four dead. Another significant example of heavy-handed policing was the police raid carried out in the early hours of October 25, 2011, against the Frank Ogawa Plaza occupation in Oakland, California (Brissonette, this issue; King 2017).

This traditional form of protest management, however, was only one of the methods used during this mobilization cycle. Largely as a result of the high level of public support obtained by mobilizations in various countries, this model of heavy-handed policing was replaced—or supplemented—by other less spectacular forms of state repression.

On the one hand, in some contexts, a less dissuasive but apparently more effective model was used for protest control. Following a classic pattern of political persecution, the alleged leaders of protests were selected and, after the campaigns ended, criminal prosecution was carried out, largely as a way to forestall the mobilizations’ effects on the political field (and the possible construction of a new governmental elite). One paradigmatic example of this can be seen in the Umbrella Revolution of Hong Kong (September–December 2014) (Kong 2017, Ng 2016), in that various leaders of the movement were criminally convicted in 2017. Alex Chow, Nathan Law, and Joshua Wong, among others, were sentenced for minor offenses, meaning that they were unable to participate in the 2019 elections (Martinez, this issue).

Together with this form of protest repression, which remains within the framework of the penal system and its capacity in terms of political persecution, an alternative management model has emerged with the last protest cycle. This involves the use of noncriminal legislation, designed primarily for the regulation of the use of public space. This system, called bureau-repression by some (Maroto Calatayud 2016, Oliver 2013, Oliver et al. 2015), involves the mass imposition of administrative fines on protesters. It is a model in which the symbolic effects of police or penal interventions are lost, but which allows for a broad application of punishment with clear dissuasive effects, especially in times of crisis. In the case of the 15-M (or Indignados) Movement in Spain (Blay 2013, Tejerina & Perugorria 2018, Weiner & Lopez 2017), this model was favored as a way to prevent the
movement’s expansion after its peak in the spring of 2011 (Maroto Calatayud 2016; Oliver 2013; Oliver & Urda, this issue). A variation on this model was used in the case of Occupy, where several civil ordinances on the use of public space were used to prevent the permanence or expansion of the camps (Brissette, this issue; King 2017).

The Importance of the Distinction between the Political and the Nonpolitical

As discussed above, the mobilizations at the start of the last decade have revealed, to a certain extent, the limits on the use of police force in contexts of political protest. In contrast to previous periods, the death of political activists appears to be unacceptable in many countries today, particularly in the Global North. This warrants additional reflection, as this consideration marks a division between methods of policing the protest and other areas of police intervention. In some countries, like Germany (Lorei 2019), Canada (Baird 2015), and the United Kingdom (Lake 2017), the use of lethal violence by police officers is a rather infrequent occurrence. In others, however, this type of violence is still a fairly routine phenomenon.

However, even in this second group, there are examples of countries where lethal police violence has practically disappeared in situations of political repression. An important reference point in this context is the United States, where fatal violence is nonexistent in cases of political mobilization and yet continues to be very frequent in standard police activity. The 2017 Police Violence Report, carried out by the Mapping Police Violence project, reports that around 1,150 people were killed by the police in the United States in 2017.5,6

Argentina provides us with another striking example in the same vein. For years, several Argentinean social organizations have been speaking out against the routine use of police violence, referred to as gatillo fácil (easy trigger). The Coordination against Police and Institutional Repression (CORREPI, as per the acronym in Spanish) records around 300 deaths per year at the hands of the police in Argentina (Verdú 2016).7 In contrast, the deaths of political activists, largely as a result of the genocide experienced under the last (1976–1983) military dictatorship (CONADEP 1984, Gillespie 1983), are a true anathema in Argentina and generate extraordinary waves of popular mobilization. The widespread protests sparked by the deaths of Mariano Ferreyra in Buenos Aires in October 2010 (Rath 2011) and Santiago Maldonado in Cushamen, Chubut, in August 2017 are particularly illuminating examples of this.8
This limit of sorts that has gradually become consolidated in relation to police interventions at political protests is probably the main reason that the use of force to stop the referendum on Catalan self-determination on October 1, 2017, caused such international astonishment. The sheer impact (both politically and in the media) of these interventions raises some questions. Since the October 1 vote, the Spanish penal system has used forms of penal exceptionalism to respond to the realization of the referendum; a good part of the government that was in power in Catalonia at the time has been imprisoned or prosecuted for very serious crimes, and other members of the cabinet have gone into exile (Fernández-Bessa et al. 2018). Interestingly, this strategy of criminal repression has not generated the same level of international commotion as the police intervention on the day of the referendum. Probably one reason for this was the purely political nature of the protest. The Spanish police tried (in vain) to prevent an inherently political act (voting) from taking place. In this case, the international outcry can be explained, to a large extent, by the fact that a limit (of sorts) on police intervention in political protests has become consolidated, especially where these protests cannot be portrayed as violent (like in Catalonia). What we are looking at is a collective sensibility to the use of heavy-handed policing at protests, which, as discussed above, is far from being achieved in other areas of police operation.

The Catalan case is the most recent case in which the state repression of political mobilization has generated virtuous forms of antirepressive struggle. As usual, the struggles of the movement cycle analyzed here have sparked various forms of antirepressive articulation, ranging from legal defense to campaigns on the street. All of this has remained within the action-repression-action framework that is so well known to social movements and which has inspired various forms of civil and political disobedience (Mitchell et al. 2013, Zinn 2002). However, this movement cycle has produced a new form of struggle against criminal repression, which has taken shape in the Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement in the United States (Lowery 2017, Taylor 2016). BLM gained momentum in 2013–2014, through online and latterly physical protests against the deaths of Trayvon Martin in Sanford, Florida, in February 2012 (Fulton & Martin 2017); Eric Garner in New York City in July 2014 (Goldstein & Schweber 2014); and Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri, in August 2014 (Davis 2016), and continues to have a significant political impact to this day. BLM questions police violence against Black people in the United States and in this way overcomes the political/nonpolitical division that still seems to affect collective sensitiv-
ity in relation to the use of police force in many countries. In fact, BLM questions and underlines the symbolic violence of certain forms of state violence that appear depoliticized, that is, recognized as mere law enforcement measures. In short, even though it is difficult to translate this struggle to many places outside the United States, BLM appears to be an extremely inspiring campaign, both for rethinking the political and for repoliticizing critiques of institutional violence.

Of course, the fact that the police have switched to a form of protest management described as soft policing does not necessarily mean that there is less state violence (although it does imply less lethal force), but rather that there is a move toward forms of violence which are more tolerable in democracies—in line with the transformation of the sensibilities pointed out by Norbert Elias (1939/2000)—and forms of violence which are not recognized as such—in line with the forms and uses of symbolic violence described by Pierre Bourdieu (1979). In this way, denying a group of citizens status as political subjects and attempting to present them as criminals is not necessarily perceived as a way of misinterpreting and precluding a movement. Certain forms of state violence in democracy can even be understood to be tolerated because they are not perceived as political violence (when, for example, the deaths of African Americans at the hands of the police year after year are presented as isolated cases or mistakes, when this is a mainstay of the socioracial domination system).

**Beyond the Impact on Social Movements: The Productive Functions of Repression**

Notwithstanding the above, the main objective of this issue is not limited to promoting a better understanding of what is referred to in the literature as the problem of repression and mobilization, how the former influences the latter, and vice versa. Among other things, this is because we believe that reducing the functions of state and punishment to repression is oversimplistic: it means underestimating the productive function, which we understand to be at least as important. It also means limiting the study of the influence of state action to the impact it has on actors involved in the movement or its social settings. We understand that the legal, police, and punitive devices deployed in recent years in many countries of the Global North against forms of legitimate political participation in democracy have a broader analytical scope than the generic relations between state and social movement. We are concerned about the broader meaning of this repression at this time.
Framing Protest as Criminality

As explored above, given the content and timing of public demands, it can be argued that these are centered on opposing the implementation of austerity policies and calling for an increase in democratic participation. Moreover, as the essays in this issue indicate, most protests adopted nonviolent forms and consisted of demonstrations involving heterogeneous groups.

Governments are using the penal system to curb resistance to the implementation of policies that recommodify goods and services and to the implementation of political arrangements that degrade the already limited democratic power of representative political systems. This is the overall function that we associate with this cycle of political repression. In other words, institutions of punishment are not being used to control crime but to contain emerging political alternatives.

A lot of material and symbolic work goes into this in the production of categories like the antiestablishment protester, and this usually develops in political discourses, across the media, in the modification of legal texts, in police action, and in the imposition of punishments and sanctions. As the articles in this issue demonstrate, the way these actors, institutions, and processes actually operate is variable.

When governments try to reconceptualize a political movement to present it as a threat—not just to some ideas but to the system as a whole, to values, to society—a series of public statements are usually made that challenge the legitimacy of the political demands of the protesters. This may take the form of disputing the content of the protests or attempting to define dissidents as criminals, dangerous people, or antiestablishment. The media is very important for this, because it contributes to shaping the framing of any topic that social movements may have managed to put on the public agenda. Even where the ideas and statements of both government officials and movement actors are presented, they are not given the same weight or credibility; the media occasionally serves to counteract governmental discourse, but this is not usually the case of the big media outlets (one reason that the internet was so important for this latest cycle) (della Porta & Diani 2006, 220–21). The media also plays a fundamental role in transforming uses of physical violence, making them more visible and subject to public scrutiny, and at the same time facilitating the exercise of symbolic violence.

On the other hand, this discursive framework, which sometimes reaches levels of moral panic (Donson et al. 2004), serves as a context to justify cer-
taint police actions of dubious legality, especially those aimed at physically restricting the rights to assembly, protest, and expression. Take, for example, one of the milestones of antiausterity protests in Spain, a massive demonstration in front of parliament, *Rodea el Congreso* (Surround Congress), which took place on September 25, 2012. The call to protest was categorized as a “hidden coup d’État” by the political representative of the police in Madrid, thus justifying a huge police deployment and facilitating the indiscriminate identifications carried out by the police and the subsequent sanctioning of protesters, in an example of bureau-repression that individualizes and invisibilizes punishment, making collective resistance difficult (González-Sánchez & Maroto 2018). Although many of the sanctions and accusations were later dismissed judicially, this dismissal did not eliminate the fear of going through a sanctioning process and its economic and personal repercussions. In these cases, it is important to note that windows of political opportunity usually remain open for less time than that required by the juridical processes which enable the exercise of fundamental rights. Therefore, these legal guarantees are relatively useless, in the short term, against the effects of these forms of protest management.\(^{12}\)

Sometimes it is impossible to fit certain interpretations into the current legal framework or, as this is an open and rather controversial process, it is not successful. Sometimes the demonization of social movements does not end up being successful enough, and another strategy is used: changes are made to legal texts, meaning that a way of acting is criminalized.

In cases where a decision is made to illegalize a particular form of conduct related to the way in which a protest takes place, the lawmaking process is used to create crime. As illegalizing political activities is difficult to reconcile in a democracy (especially when the public’s perception of those activities has not changed), certain acts or habits associated with the group to be controlled are often targeted (such as going around with your face masked, a classic and common resource in various countries, or marijuana use in the Berkeley branch of the Free Speech Movement or in the Oakland headquarters of the Black Panthers).

This penalization of conduct can act alongside (or separately from) decriminalization processes, that is, with the expansion of police powers in surveillance, identifications, and use of force, for example. Thus, potentially criminal police actions become legal and officially unproblematic.
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On Symbolic Violence: Performing Politics through Criminalization

These possible phases and outcomes, which vary between countries, appear to have had two fundamental (and interdependent) effects on the cycle analyzed. On the one hand, there is the issue of deterrence, which is usually associated with repression and police control of the protest. Here, the idea is that the use of force (charges, rubber bullets, and beatings) or sanctions (i.e., fines and imprisonment) raise the cost of participation in the protest. This viewpoint has been addressed in different ways in the literature on social movements (Davenport et al. 2005; Gladun, this issue; McPhail & McCarthy 2005).

On the other hand, and precisely because the persecution of political proposals or demands is not openly acceptable in a democracy, we find the process of depoliticizing the protest movement. Here, some very interesting social nomination processes take place to define what that group of people is. The logic is that if instead of political subjects exercising their rights, protesters are conceived of as criminals, the state can refuse to recognize their demands and, in addition, may use the forces of law and order on them. So, we are faced with an act of symbolic construction. Although most studies on the penalization of protest have analyzed the impact this has on the articulation of the protest, in this issue we are more concerned with the broader effects of this control (as well as political discourse and legislative activity). We are concerned with the effects not on the social movements being controlled but on the broader public, the general audience, and the spectators. The idea is to start out from the Durkheimian recognition that punishment has effects that go beyond penalized persons and that the audience could even be considered the main recipient (Durkheim 1893/1984, 84).

Thus, the names politicians are using for protesters (antiestablishment, rioters, prototerrorists, etc.) and the activities they perform (harassment, violence, coup d’état, etc.) have been shown to be crucial. In addition, police actions are significant regardless of the effect that they may have on the person they directly implicate. Seeing police (live or on television) identifying protesters or charging on a demonstration sends the message that there is something wrong about what is happening that justifies police intervention, because, culturally, we understand that the police only act when an offense is being committed or in response to dangerous people (Loader 1997). The fact that protests are filled with police, and the fact that they intervene, gives off a message that what is happening is dangerous, if not illegal (as long as no use of force that may be construed as illegitimate takes place,
for example, where use of force is perceived as violent). In addition, when the police begin to limit the exercise of fundamental rights through decrees or ordinances, in which matters of traffic, hygiene, or noise are dealt with, the activity of protesters is devalued by processes that equate the exercise of fundamental political rights with mere troublesome behavior (Maroto Calatayud 2013, 46).

All these processes seem to have been oriented toward depoliticizing deeply political movements, presenting these movements as related to legality, rather than politics. On the one hand, framing these issues in criminal terms means that the only response left to those in power is to try to prevent the crime; the state response is almost determined by the definition of the problem. In the case of Catalonia, for example, the Spanish government seems to have entrusted the resolution of the conflict to judicial decisions (that are national first and international where they depend on extraditions). On the other hand, the debate is shifting from public spending, fundamental rights, access to basic necessities, and states’ independence from economic influences to whether or not a demonstration was duly authorized, whether a dozen demonstrators wore balaclavas, or whether shouting certain slogans ought to be allowed. Thus, when a protest appears in the media and reaches the wider public, it is framed in terms of law and order and not in terms of groups making political demands and proposing legitimate alternatives in a democracy.

This resignification process is, however, open in that its acceptance and uncritical reproduction on the part of the citizenry is not guaranteed (Gamson et al. 1992); sometimes it will be successful, and at other times it will not. In any case, we understand that the important thing is not so much what ends up happening, but how the process is tipped toward success or failure. In this issue, we present an international approach to understanding this problem.

**Policing the Protest: Snapshots**

The dialectical relationship between forms of protest and forms of police control is a key consideration in the study of the state control of social protest (Davenport 2005; della Porta & Reiter 1998, 1–8). Of course, there is room for nuances and, depending on the focus of the research, this question may acquire more or less relevance. However, the relationship between police action and its effects on the weakening or strengthening of the protest is a question to be solved empirically (the actual scope of the data and the question of whether or not general laws can be established are a different
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matter; see Tilly 2005, 211–13). In this vein, Andrii Gladun’s article in this issue provides a good example of how to handle the problem in a nuanced, spatially and temporally situated way. His study of the Euromaidan protests in Ukraine highlights the importance of the type of state response to the development of a social movement. More evidence is provided for what is already known about this phenomenon and more nuanced forms of measurement are developed. To do this, Gladun constructs a statistical model that incorporates variations in time, geographical distribution of repression and protest, and type of police action. In fact, type of police action appears to be decisive. Gladun suggests that, for the case he studies, low levels of state repression encouraged mobilization, and that when repression became harsher, it had dissuasive effects on the demonstrators. The perception of the legitimacy of repression is presented as key here.

The legitimacy of actions (whether police or citizen actions) depends greatly on the subject’s perceived legitimacy as a political actor. Emily Brissette’s text analyzes the symbolic struggle around the attempt to delegitimize Occupy Oakland protests through two interlinked processes: the physical prohibition banning certain people from accessing the spaces in which the bulk of the protests took place and the allocation of the label “criminal” to citizens doing politics in a noninstitutional way. Here, Brissette argues that it was precisely the failure of the initial (violent) police reactions that resulted in softer, less visible forms of repression: the stay-away orders for specific individuals. Her discourse analysis, supplemented by her observations, allows her to identify three main actors and their different tactics for presenting Occupy Oakland as a legitimate political movement (in one case) and an illegitimate political movement (in the others). For its part, the state adopted the strategy of depoliticizing through criminalization and presented the movement as violent—even before the acts that were supposed to provide evidence for said violence were carried out. The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), on the other hand, articulated legal resistance against the stay-away orders and strongly emphasized the right to free speech. They thus obfuscated the actual material and political roots of the protest, a protest that was articulated, for the most part, against the model of capitalist democracy developed in recent years. Finally, the Anti-Repression Committee of Occupy Oakland reacted to state criminalization by speaking out against these practices and the broader effects on the stigmatization of the movement.

This discussion of theoretically less intense repression is further developed by Oliver and Urda as they delve into the concept of bureau-repression to
analyze the introduction of the public safety law in Spain as the culmination of the repressive cycle. As in the case of Oakland, this case is marked by an increase in the use of sanctions originally designed for other cases. For the Indignados, the Spanish state tended to opt for administrative fines, a type of sanction that rarely appears in the analysis of forms of state punishment (see, though, Faraldo Cabana 2017, O’Malley 2009). Oliver and Urda chart the huge increase in the number of fines imposed by the police (who broke the law by systematically operating without ID badges). In this way, although there was no visible repression, individual fines were subsequently sent to the homes of the protesters (occasionally to people who had not even attended the demonstrations in question). Although judges subsequently dismissed most of the fines imposed, this is another case in which the judicial process is itself a punishment (Feeley 1979). The article then shows how the government promoted the in-depth reform of administrative sanctioning legislation and the penal code in 2012. These reforms were approved in 2015 and entail two important developments: the ad hoc prohibition of a large part of the repertoire of nonviolent protest and an increase in the potential sum of fines to 600,000 euros.

This use of a more individualized and less visible form of repression is also described by Miguel A. Martínez in relation to mobilizations in Hong Kong. In this case, the focus of the protests was the demand for universal suffrage, although given the existing differential access to voting, it also indirectly involved questioning the political and economic order. The author uses dozens of semistructured interviews and field notes to discuss the dialectic between police actions and protest actions, underlining the importance of other social movements (of a reactionary nature) and the influence they had on the introduction of harsher police repression (as there was public support for this). In addition, he discusses a prolonged form of repression, which was more oriented toward dismantling and preventing movements like Umbrella from being able to reestablish themselves and achieve success; in other words, it was oriented toward decapitating the movement.

Finally, Matt Clement reflects on the meaning of these events, using a broader temporal perspective and taking into account a wider range of agents. Thus, based on cases from the United States and the United Kingdom, he reflects on the role of unions, actors who were historically very important for the articulation and implementation of the protest, and their links to some new social movements like UK Uncut. Clement focuses on certain reactions to police excesses that ended in a series of disturbances (riots) and were framed by the press as moral panic. He describes how this political
treatment gave continuity to and fed into other xenophobic sentiments that culminated in a Brexit campaign that was fundamentally racist, rather than being structured in anticapitalist terms and critiquing the European Union’s economic model. The text concludes with a reflection on the role of political parties that were traditionally associated with the labor movement, such as the Labour Party.

The texts published in this issue of *Social Justice* aim to give a broad and varied view of several events in different nations that, nevertheless, had an international impact and took on an international meaning almost immediately. Although in each case the specific political motivations and articulations of agents and their actions were local in scope and interpretation, the context in which they arose—an international crisis—makes it difficult to ignore the fact that almost all the protests centered around questioning the political and economic order. Moreover, they took place in a context in which it had become clear, firstly, that in times of crisis there are winners and losers and, secondly, that democracies are also political systems where power is exercised, where those who threaten or question the status quo are persecuted.

The criminalization of this cycle of protests is important for reasons that go beyond penality itself and beyond the relationship between the state and social movements. What is at stake, as we have already suggested, is the substantial transformation of the structures and functions of the state. Different authors from the field of the sociology of punishment have warned that neoliberalism consists, above all, of a process of state transformation and that the use of penality is central to this process (Beckett 1997, Wacquant 2009). Structural changes do not happen without group disputes, and in recent decades, a form of government that relies heavily on law and order policies appears to have developed in the democracies of the Global North. The state management of this last wave of protests is a good example of a governmentality that, under the banners of crime and democracy, uses punishment for purposes that are not particularly democratic (Simon 2007, 271).

Thus, the criminalization of protests and their management have a political importance that goes beyond specific disputes. Each cycle of protest repression in a democracy, if successful, contributes to transforming the political culture of a country, to redefining the limits of what can and cannot be done, the thinkable and the unthinkable, the sensible. When political disputes are solved through the use of force, this contributes to producing an authoritarian political culture. As such, the cycle of mobilization that characterized the start of the last decade seems strangely far off today. The political situation
is much more ominous today than could have been imagined in many parts of the globe at that time. As we begin a new decade, Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt’s (2018) ruminations appear particularly pertinent. They recollect that, at least since the end of the Cold War, democratic systems no longer expire due to traditional military coups (see, though, the case of Egypt); rather, they now succumb to the corruption of their institutions by elites and authoritarian leaders. This is the best description of what has recently happened in Turkey, Brazil, and Hungary, but also in the United States and Spain/Catalonia. Events like those that occurred in Catalonia can be understood as a sort of reversal of the concept of eventful protest (della Porta 2008): an eventful repression that transforms subjectivities in an undemocratic sense and suggests that a good part of the antiausterity protests that took place in Spain would be more harshly repressed by the Spanish state today.

The analytical (and political) challenge in the near future will be to investigate how the repression of the protest will be reconfigured in the context of this authoritarian turn.

NOTES

7. See www.correpi.org for more information.
10. We are not suggesting that state violence is a zero-sum game battled out between physical and symbolic violence, i.e., that the reduction in physical violence has led to the use of more symbolic forms. However, we do believe that the type of restrictions described by Elias
(1939/2000) enable the use of more sublimated forms, at least in the use of violence against the protest, and that the greatest from of sublimation is presenting violence as nonviolent.

11. Probably Durkheim (1893/1984) and Foucault (1975/2012, 2013/2015) were the authors who underlined the productive character of state punishment most emphatically. For these (and other) authors’ perspectives, and a consideration of punishment in all its complexity, see Garland (1990).

12. Interestingly, 14 of those arrested during the night of May 15, 2011, in Madrid—these arrests were one of the triggers of the 15M encampment in the center of Madrid—were tried almost eight years thereafter, in February 2019. The criminal procedure was conducted in accordance with the somewhat more lenient legislation that was in force back in 2011 and led to small fines. See Redacción El Salto, “El proceso contra los detenidos la noche del 15M se salda con multas de 380 euros,” El Salto, February 11, 2019, at www.elsaltodiario.com/libertades/juicio-detenidos-noche-15m-multas-380-euros.

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